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SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORTS
-AN INTERNAL VIEW
XILLIAm F. TOMPKINS*
The threat of international communism has raised two contrasting
fears in this country. On the one hand is a fear that we are not ade-
quately protected against the communist threat and, on the other hand,
there is the fear that in our zeal to provide security in the struggle
against the communist conspiracy we may divert from our tradition of
constitutional liberty. This problem, essentially, is part of the age-old
problem of reconciling individual freedom and the needs of the state.
Justice Cardozo has described this as one of the paradoxes of legal science.
This paradox is always in the minds of those charged with enforcing the
laws of this country.
Before commenting on the reports prepared by the Commission on
Government Security and the Special Committee of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, a short history of events which have
led up to the present federal employee security program, and to those
studies, should assist in an understanding of the basic issues.
Security measures affecting civilian personnel are not new in
Government.' There is evidence that President Lincoln's Administra-
tion felt obliged to take certain steps to guard against disloyalty during
the war between the States. President Wilson in 1917 issued a con-
fidential executive order permitting agency heads to remove summarily
an employee whose employment, by reason of his conduct, sympathies or
utterances or because of other reasons growing out of the war, was be-
lieved to be inimical to public welfare. As is apparent in these instances,
these steps were taken at times of national emergency-and this, of
course, has been the critical factor in similar and more recent measures.
For the first 123 years after the establishment of the Federal
Government, the Executive Branch had almost absolute discretion in the
selection of applicants and the removal of civilian officers and employees.
An employee could be lawfully dismissed without reason. The Lloyd-
LaFollette Act of 1912, which was strongly supported by the proponents
of a merit system, provided for a statement of reasons to the employee
and an opportunity for reply before discharge could be effected under the
standard established by the Act. That standard is simply that such dis-
charge promotes the efficiency of the civil service.2 The Lloyd-LaFollette
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice.
1 For a full discussion of historical developments in this field, see "History,"
COMMISSION REPORT, 5.
2The Act provides in part, "No persons in the classified civil service of the
United States shall be removed or suspended without pay therefrom except for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service and for reasons given in
writing." 5 U.S.C. §652 (1952), as amended.
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Act does not require a hearing nor does it require confrontation of any
witnesses by the employee.' It is still the basic law governing personnel
discharges in Government.
The Veterans Preference Act is basically similar to the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act except that an appeal to the Civil Service Commission is
provided to veterans if the agency decision is adverse. 4
In 1939 Congress enacted the Hatch Act which in Section 9A
prohibited employment in Government of members "of any political
party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our Constitu-
tional form of government." In 1940 an act was passed to give the
War and Navy Departments and the Coast Guard authority to remove
summarily any employee in the interests of national security. The Civil
Service Commission in 1940 issued Circular No. 222 advising that the
names of members of the Communist Party, the German-American
Bund or other communist, nazi or fascist organizations, would not be
certified to departments and agencies for federal employment. In 1941
Congress initiated the practice of embodying riders to appropriation acts
for the several departments and agencies of Government barring pay-
ment of compensation to any person who advocates, or who is a member
of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of our Government
by force or violence. In 1942 the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to
3The Lloyd-LaFollette Act provides, in part, "No examination of witnesses
nor any trial or hearing shall be required except at the discretion of the officer
or employee directing the removal of suspension without pay." Under the Veterans
Preference Act, preference eligibles are to answer "personally and in writing"
and, upon authorized appeal to the Civil Service Commission, to make a
"personal appearance or an appearance through a designated representative."
5 U.S.C. §863 (1952). The right to "appear personally" has been held not to
require an adversary hearing with the right to subpoena or confront witnesses.
Deviny v. Campbell, 194 F 2d 876 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 826 (1952). The
phrase "personally and in writing" has been construed to mean that the employee
"shall personally answer the charges in writing" and that he shall not have a
"minimal" hearing at the agency level. Washington v. Summerfield, 228 F. 2d
452 (1955). However, the U. S. Court of Claims recently held in an action for
back salary by the same plaintiff that the act gives employees the right to appear
personally at the agency level. Washington v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 284
(1957). Petition for certiorari on this question has been filed in the United States
Supreme Court July 31, 1957, 26 Law Week 3055, August 6, 1957. Under civil
service regulations veterans appealing to the Civil Service Commission are af-
forded a formal hearing, in which they may appear personally, by representative,
or both, and present witnesses on their behalf. 5 C.F.R. §22 (1949).
4 Section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 provides in part "No
permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who has completed a probationary or
trial period employed in the civil service, or in any establishment, agency, bureau,
administration, project, or department . . . shall be discharged, suspended for
more than thirty days, furloughed without pay, reduced in rank or compensation,
or debarred for appointment except for such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service . . ." See note 3, supra.
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Executive Order, adopted a regulation authorizing denial of employment
whenever there is reasonable doubt as to loyalty. The regulation further
stated that the above criteria could be applied in deciding whether re-
moval of an incumbent employee "promotes the efficiency of the civil
service," as stated in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
In March 1947 a Government loyalty program was instituted by
Executive Order 9835 based in part on the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
Originally, the standard for dismissal in this program was "on all the
evidence that reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person in-
volved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." This proved
inadequate, however, and four years later, in 1951, the standard which
had been used several years earlier during World War II, "reasonable
doubt as to loyalty," was adopted.
The loyalty program was a definite improvement over existing
practices so far as the rights of the individual employee were concerned.
It introduced uniformity and afforded more protection to the employee
by providing for more thorough investigation and a hearing under pre-
scribed procedures and standards. However, in practical operation it was
found that immediate suspension pending final determination was im-
possible even though the adverse information was alarming. Secondly,
"disloyalty" was often found to be an inadequate test to screen employees
in key Government positions. In some instances it was felt that the
available information demanded a finding of loyalty even though the
same information indicated that his employment would not be in the
interests of national security. There was no middle ground between
"clearance" and "disloyal." This program did not take into considera-
tion possible negligence on the part of the employee, irresponsibility or
the tendency to disclose information to unauthorized individuals as
having a bearing upon his fitness for public employment. Finally, the
appeals were time-consuming and the findings upon appeal by the
Loyalty Review Board were, in effect, binding upon the heads of the
departments and agencies.5
It was because of such inadequacies in the loyalty program that
disturbed Government officials sought legislative relief which resulted in
5 While Part II 3 and Part III 1 of Executive Order 9835 stated that the
decisions of the Civil Service Commission on appeal were advisory to the heads
of departments and agencies, the Loyalty Review Board by directive to depart-
ments and agencies dated December 17, 194s advised, "The President expects
that loyalty policies, procedures and standards will be uniformly applied in the
adjudication of loyalty cases by the several agencies, and the responsibility for
coordinating the program and assuming uniformity has been placed in the
Loyalty Review Board. The recommendations of the Civil Service Commission
in cases of employees covered by Section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act of
1944 are mandatory, and the loyalty of persons not covered by Section 14 should
be judged by the same standards. Therefore, if uniformity is to be attained it is
neressary that the head of an agency follow the recommendation of the Loyalty
Reqiew Board in all cases." (Emphasis added.)
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the passage of the Act of August 26, 1950.6 This law authorized the
heads of certain departments and agencies to suspend immediately and
eventually terminate the employment of any civilian officer or employee
when such action was deemed necessary or advisable in the interests of
national security. This act differs significantly from the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act in that it requires a hearing before termination.
Section 3 of that law provided that its provisions "shall apply to
such other departments and agencies of the government as the President
may from time to time deem necessary in the best interests of national
security." It was under the authority of this law that Executive Order
10450 issued on April 27, 1953, extending the application of that law
to the entire Executive Branch.7
The present program provides for investigation, written notice of
charges to the employee, for suspension and for a hearing. Final and
sole authority to discharge was vested in the head of the department or
agency. In summary the new program accomplished the following
purposes:
(1) Established criteria to serve as guides to the heads of the
departments and agencies in determining what type of
information warranted investigation.
(2) Established a uniform security standard throughout the
Executive Branch, thus eliminating the operation of two
separate programs, i.e., under Executive Order 9835 and
the Act of August 26, 1950, in specified departments
and agencies.
(3) Required a full field investigation of each occupant of a
sensitive position.
(4) Established uniform procedures for all departments and
agencies, which did not exist among departments and
agencies named in the 1950 Act.
(5) Provided for suspension pending hearing and prior to
termination.
(6) Placed final responsibility in the head of each department
or agency.
(7) Permitted termination in the interests of national se-
curity without requiring proof amounting to disloyalty.
(8) Made appointment of applicants in the Executive Branch
subject to a minimum investigation.
This latter investigation includes a check of available Government
investigative sources (known as a National Agency Check) and written
65 U.S.C. §22-1 (1952).
7 The departments and agencies originally embraced by the Act are the
Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Resources
Board and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
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inquiries concerning the individual to local law enforcement agencies,
former employers, supervisors, references, schools and colleges. Finally,
the Civil Service Commission was made responsible for a continuing study
of the program to assure that adequate programs are maintained by the
departments and agencies and that the employees are receiving fair, im-
partial and equitable treatment.
On June 11, 1956 the Supreme Court, in the Cole v. Young
s
decision, found that it was the intent of the Congress that the Act of
August 26, 1950 should apply only to those employees who occupy
positions affected with the national security, that is, sensitive positions.
Hereafter, when reference is made to the present program, it is intended
to mean the program as constituted prior to the Cole v. Young decision.
Mention will be made, however, of the present status of employees in
non-sensitive positions as a result of that decision.
The authority for the head of the department or agency immedi-
ately to suspend an employee on whom substantial information of a
derogatory nature is developed was first established by the Act of August
26, 1950 to correct a deficiency then existing in the loyalty program.
Many of the suspensions in this program occurred as a part of the
review required in all cases wherein a full field investigation had pre-
viously been conducted under the loyalty program. Because of the back-
log created in the review and processing of so many old cases, it is true
that some employees incurred financial hardships pending the final deter-
minations of their cases. It was because of the mandatory suspension
provisions of the Act of August 26, 1950 and the hardships thus created
that the Attorney General recommended to the Congress that the law be
amended to authorize suspension at the discretion of the department or
agency head. This proposal is still pending in Congress and unless the
amendment is passed, suspension prior to termination will continue to be
mandatory under the Act.
The discussion of the reports of the Commission on Government
Security and the Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, hereinafter referred to as the Commission report
and the Special Committee report, respectively, shall be confined to those
recommendations that might be considered basic modifications in the
present structure of the federal personnel security program.
It is agreed by the Commission and the Special Committee that
(a) there is a need for a civilian personnel screening program of a
loyalty-security nature,"0 and (b) that the process of determining an
individual's fitness for public employment is administrative in nature and
not a criminal prosecution or trial." They differ as to the employees to
8 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
9 Letter of April 16, 1956 from the Attorney General to the Speaker of the
House and the Vice President-reiterated in letters of July 5, 1956 and July 17,
1957. See note 19, infra.
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be covered by such program and the termination standard to be applied.
Under the present employee security program, prior to Cole v. Young,
the standard "clearly consistent with the interests of national security"
had been applicable to all employees. The Commission recommends that
the discarded "reasonable doubt as to loyalty" standard be made applica-
ble to all employees. It made further recommendations, however, which
would greatly alter the circumstances under which this standard would
operate. Even though the Commission recommends a return to the
"reasonable doubt as to loyalty" standard for its loyalty program, it also
proposes a revision of the Civil Service criteria to permit termination of
an employee on loyalty information under Civil Service procedures as
well."2 It is interesting to note that the Commission in its report states
that the decision whether to proceed under the proposed new loyalty
program or under the Civil Service procedures may be a difficult one
and directs that the Civil Service procedures be followed whenever
possible.13
The Special Committee has recognized the basic inadequacies of a
loyalty program and differs with the Commission on the question of
scope of the program and termination standards to be applied. The
Special Committee recommends that only employees in positions desig-
nated as sensitive be subject to a program based upon a standard of
"whether or not in the interest of the United States the employment or
retention in employment of the individual is advisable."' 4 The Special
Committee believes that this standard gives "broader protection to the
Government than did the test of loyalty"' 5 and that "some persons who
are loyal may nevertheless be a danger to the interests of the United
States in positions of trust because of lack of dependability or subjection
to pressure."'
6
The Special Committee believes individuals employed in non-
sensitive positions should be subjected to some type of loyalty screening.' 7
10 COMMISSION REPORT, 40; SPECIAL COMMITrEE REPORT, 6.
11 COMMISSION REPORT, 659; SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 173.
12 The Commission recommends amendment of the Civil Service regulations
to include the criteria: (a) "Any behavior, activities or associations which tend to
show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy," (b) "Any facts, other
than those tending to establish reasonable doubt as to loyalty, which furnish reason
to believe that the ndividual may be subjected to coercion, influence or pressure
which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of national security."
COMMIsssIoN REPORT, 83.
13 COMMISSION REPORT, 85.
14 SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 149.
15 SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 150.
16 Id.
17 In a recent Personnel Security Advisory Committee survey it was deter-
mined that approximately 524,170 employees occupy sensitive positions, which
figure represents approximately 21 per cent of the total federal civilian employ-
ment. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 147.
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The Special Committee makes no recommendations as to the structure
of such a program or as to procedures to be followed. The Special
Committee has concerned itself primarily with recommending uniform
standards and procedures for those occupying sensitive positions. This,
I feel, fails to meet the complete problem with which the Government
is confronted.
In actual operation at the present time, however, the program
which has existed since June 11, 1956 as a result of the Cole v. Young
decision closely resembles the program proposed by the Special Commit-
tee. Only sensitive position employees are subject to a uniform security
program and there is no uniform program for processing loyalty cases
involving non-sensitive position employees. The heads of departments
and agencies, at this writing, act independently in these cases under the
Civil Service procedures and the "reasonable doubt as to loyalty" stand-
ard found in the Civil Service regulations.' s Under such procedures em-
ployees would not be entitled to a formal hearing at the agency level.
Experience since the Cole v. Young decision has shown that there is a
reluctance among the departments and agencies to commence proceedings
under these circumstances. This situation is a principal reason for the
Department of Justice endorsement, shortly after the Cole v. Young
decision, and again this year, of legislation to extend the Act of August
26, 1950 to all employees as an interim measure pending study of the
report of the Commission on Government Security."°
In respect to applicants and probationary employees, the Commission
believes that an applicant who is rejected because of reasonable doubt as
to loyalty should be given an opportunity to answer charges and explain
his position in an informal interview with an officer of the employing
agency, as well as supply affidavits or other relevant information. There-
after, if such reasonable doubt persists, the applicant would be afforded
an opportunity to be heard before a hearing examiner of the proposed
Central Security Office."° The Commission further recommends that
probationary employees should be processed in substantially the same
manner.
The Special Committee would not allow an applicant such a com-
plete hearing but does recommend that any applicant for a position
covered by its proposed program, i.e., a sensitive position, should, so far
as is consistent with the interests of the national security, be furnished
185 C.F.R. §9.101(a) and 2.106(a) (7) (1949). While this test has remained
in civil service regulations, it has been inapplicable since the inception of the
old loyalty program and Exec. Order No. 10450.
19Letters to the Honorable Tom Murray, Chairman, Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives from the Attorney General
and the Deputy Attorney General dated July 5, 1956, and July 17, 1957,
respectively.
20 CoMMissioN REPORT, 51.
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with a statement of all adverse security information and permitted to
file affidavits to be included in the personnel file and incorporated in any
investigative reports on the applicant. The Special Committee further
recommends that, where the general counsel of the department or agency
recommends, the applicant should be permitted to explain unfavorable
information in an informal interview. With respect to probationary em-
ployees, the Special Committee feels that the notice and opportunity to
reply provided for in the Act of August 26, 1950 are sufficient.2' The
Special Committee observes that guaranteeing full procedural rights to
applicants for Federal employment could burden the Government with
proceedings in cases in which prospects for employment are almost non-
existent or with cases where an applicant might be interested solely in
obtaining a Government clearance rather than ultimate employment.
Some persons, apparently, are under the impression that all em-
ployees entering Government service are completely investigated and
their cases adjudicated prior to entrance on duty. This is the exception
rather than the rule. The Government, just as any other employer, is a
competitor in the labor market. For this reason many employees are
placed on the rolls subject to investigation although some preliminary
checks are made. This means, therefore, that, in the event unfavorable
loyalty information is subsequently developed, such persons would be
accorded the notice and opportunity to reply provided for employees in
the present program.
The two recent studies agree that employee termination proceedings
are administrative in nature and are not a criminal prosecution or trial.
Under the present program, while every effort is made to produce wit-
nesses at security hearings to testify in behalf of the Government, there
is no requirement for such appearance. Both the Commission and the
Special Committee feel that employees cannot be granted full confronta-
tion of all witnesses but have made certain administrative recommenda-
tions designed to strike a compromise in the matter. The Commission
states, in substance, that confrontation of informants regularly engaged
and needed in investigative activities should not be required. It feels,
however, that information furnished by unidentified casual informants,
i.e., those not regularly engaged in investigative activities, such as
neighbors and co-workers, should not be considered in determining an
individual's employability unless the informant can be cross-examined in
hearing or through interrogatory or deposition. The Commission feels
that this rule should also apply to identified sources, unless such sources
are unavailable due to death, incompetency or "other reason." The
Special Committee also believes that confrontation of regular informants
should not be required. It concludes that screening and hearing boards
should be permitted to require testimony from so-called casual in-
21 SPECIAL COMMirrEE REPORT, 185.
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formants, but it does not preclude consideration of information furnished
by such informants in the event they are not confronted in some manner.
Both reports add that in all cases the employee should be fully informed
of the substance of the charges. This, of course, is already a requirement
under the present program.
It is my personal view that a great deal of the controversy about
the present program is due to a lack of understanding of how loyalty
investigations are conducted and reported. It has been said, for instance,
that an employee is defenseless against malicious gossip, and that only
unfavorable information is reported to the employing agency. This is
not true. All cases involving loyalty information must be referred to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full field investigation. This
means that all the plausible sources of information concerning the em-
ployee's background are checked, including birth records, education,
former employments, personal references, places of residence, and police
and credit records. When the entire investigation is completed, the em-
ploying agency has a complete picture of the adult life of the individual,
including the comments of a representative group of individuals with
whom he has had contact during his life. Much of the investigation is
aimed at determining the significance and accuracy of the unfavorable
information. Favorable comments are as material as unfavorable in-
formation and are set forth in the investigative reports forwarded to the
interested department or agency.
Those who contend that vicious or malicious gossip plays an im-
portant role in these cases have not read many, if any, of these reports.
The quality and coverage of these investigations are such that false
information probably has been proved to be false or, in the face of the
favorable facts developed, shown to be lacking in credibility. In other
instances, while unfavorable information such as an individual's attend-
ance at or participation in communist-front activities in the past may be
shown to be true, other facts may be developed to corroborate the em-
ployee's contention that he was not aware of the communist influence at
that time and would not have participated had he been aware of it.
Both the Special Committee and the Commission studied the sug-
gestion that one who furnishes information of an unfavorable nature
should be compelled to appear and testify, or the information should be
ignored. Basically, employees are investigated to determine their fitness
for public service. If the Government is compelled to ignore available
unfavorable information which is believed to be reliable, then employ-
ment standards will not be maintained and, more important, national
interests might be jeopardized. It would seem that the responsibility of
the Executive Branch for the management of the day-to-day affairs of
Government requires that it be permitted to exercise some judgment and
every effort be made to resolve such issues as best it can, rather than
compel it to ignore the information. As a practical matter, it is difficult
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to visualize any responsible agency head or supervisor being able at first
to ignore and later to forget such information in the future handling of
the employee involved.
It is also of basic importance that the tremendous confidence which
the American public has always demonstrated in cooperating with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in its several areas of investigation be
preserved. The personnel security program is only one segment of FBI
investigative responsibility. Once our citizens get the impression that
information given by them in confidence to the FBI may some day be
publicly disclosed without consent of the source, they will on an ever-
increasing basis withhold information in their possession that would be
of value to their government.
It may not be generally known that whenever the FBI is compelled
to withhold the identity of a source of information, descriptive data are
furnished concerning the reliability of the source and, where appropriate,
the circumstances which permitted the undisclosed source to obtain the
information reported. Additional investigation is conducted whenever
the employing agency desires it.
The recommendation of the Commission to create an independent
agency of Government to supervise and coordinate the several personnel-
type loyalty-security programs raises the question of whether such central-
ization of authority materially improves the implementation of such
programs. The creation of an agency, or even a separate office such as
the Special Committee has proposed, to supervise, coordinate and resolve
these programs within the other departments and agencies without any
responsibility for the successful functioning of these departments and
agencies may be unrealistic.
Both reports emphasize a need for uniformity and coordination,
including central review and supervision, in the several civilian personnel
security programs. To accomplish the proposed uniformity and co-
ordination, both reports recommend the establishment of a new and
independent agency or office.22 The Special Committee would establish
"The Office of Director of Personnel and Information Security" in the
Executive Office of the President. The duties of the director of this
office would include conducting a continuous review of and supervision
over the personnel loyalty-security screening programs and the classifica-
tion of defense information under Executive Order 10501. The director
would make recommendations to the President which, when embodied
in regulations and approved by the President, would be binding upon the
departments and agencies concerned. The Commission recommends
creation of a "Central Security Office" as an independent agency within
the Executive Branch. The duties of the director of this agency would
22 COMMISSION REPORT, 89. SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 137.
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be essentially the same as those recommended by the Special Committee.
No provision is made for requiring the various departments and agencies
to accept his recommendations.
In order to obtain added uniformity the Special Committee would
create a central screening board in the Civil Service Commission to deter-
mine whether or not security charges should be issued against an in-
dividual. Where necessary, the screening board would prepare the
charges and thereafter a hearing would be conducted before a separate
board.
The Commission would permit initial screening, including the
preparation of charges, to take place at the department or agency level.
Hearing examiners established within the Central Security Office would
conduct the initial hearing and, following a decision by the department
or agency after such hearing, the employee would be permitted to appeal
to a central review board within the Central Security Office. Of par-
ticular interest to me is that both reports have concluded that the heads
of the department or agency must have the right to make the final
determination, as is the case under the present program.
Recommendations providing new or additional procedures for super-
vision, coordination and appeal must be considered, not only on their own
merits, but in relation to the over-all program and the amount of time
such steps may add to the processing of the average case to final decision.
Delays in handling of cases under present procedures have led to criticism
of the program, yet the present program is much simpler than either of
those proposed. It consists basically only of investigation, issuance of
charges, a hearing and final determination. The Commission's proposals
will require considerably more time for processing these cases and could
cause a backlog to develop. The likelihood of such backlog becomes
particularly apparent in view of the requirement that all cases in the
various security screening programs must channel through the three-man
review board."  Under these circumstances, a complete breakdown of
the several personnel screening programs could occur. Since the Com-
mission's program would be established by legislation, changes could
only be accomplished through amendment of the law.
The possibility of added delays exists also in the recommended pro-
gram of the Special Committee. The proposed screening board is author-
ized to conduct informal hearings prior to preparing the charges. These
proceedings would be followed by a hearing before a separate board and
then the final determination by the head of the department or agency.
While this procedure obviously requires more elaborate processing of
federal employees than the present program, the backlog possible under
the Commission program no doubt would not occur since the Special
23The Commission recommends that the programs relating to federal, in-
dustrial and seaport and waterfront employees, as well as the proposed civil air
transport program, be subject to such processing. Co.sm.iissiomr REPoRT, 90.
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Committee recommends that the industrial security program be excepted
from this central screening and that the port security program be
abolished.
The Commission recommends that the statutory right of appeal for
veterans to the Civil Service Commission on the merits be repealed.24
This program, in effect, would be depriving employees on whom there is
a loyalty question of a right to a hearing by suggesting the utilization
of Civil Service procedures. Under the latter there is provision only for
notice and an opportunity to reply to charges whereas, under the present.
program, one occupying a sensitive position is entitled to a hearing, also.
Under the present program employees including veterans do not
have the right to appeal from the decision of the head of the agency if
their employment has been terminated under the provisions of Executive
Order 10450.2" However, this does not deprive the veteran of his right
to appeal to the Civil Service Commission in instances where his discharge
is based on grounds other than security. Under the Commission proposal
the veteran would be deprived of his Civil Service appeal rights not only
when his discharge involves security, but also in all other instances. The
enlarged Civil Service criteria proposed by the Commission would seem
to permit any case that may arise to be processed under those procedures
and, consequently, processing under its proposed loyalty program could be
a rarity. The numerous safeguards proposed by the Commission in con-
nection with its loyalty program would not be applicable to cases processed
under the Civil Service procedures.
I disagree with the Commission's concept2" that termination on
loyalty grounds under the Civil Service procedures would avoid "brand-
ing" an employee as "disloyal" or as a "security risk" or that the
"branding" occurs only at the time of termination. It is quite con-
ceivable that an employee proceeded against under Civil Service pro-
cedures may be "branded" solely by the issuance of charges against him.
Early in 1955 the President requested the Internal Security Di-
vision of the Department of Justice to review the operation of the
employee security program. As a result of that study the Attorney
General submitted several recommendations to the President on March 4,
1955 which were approved by him and forwarded to each department
and agency. These proposals included a suggestion that a personal inter-
view with the employee prior to suspension would be helpful since he
might have information that would help resolve the issues raised. The
Attorney General recommended that the statement of charges should be
drawn as specifically as possible and the agency's legal officer should be
consulted concerning the specificity of the charges and the sufficiency of
24 COMMISSION REPORT, 86.
25 The authority to terminate under the Act of August 26, 1950 is granted
"notwithstanding . . . the provisions of any other law." See note 6, supra.
26 CoMMisssIoN REPORT, 84.
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the information. He indicated the legal officer also should be present
at the hearing to act as an adviser to the Board as to procedural matters
and to the employee if he is not represented by counsel. The importance
of having persons possessing the highest degree of integrity, ability and
good judgment as members of hearing boards was stressed. The Attorney
General also stated that every effort should be made to produce witnesses
at the hearing so that such witnesses may be confronted and cross-
examined by the employee so long as their production would not jeopard-
ize the national security.
The present program has not been without uniformity and co-
ordination even though responsibility for the program was placed upon
the head of each department and agency who "shall be responsible for
establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective
program." When the program was first instituted the Department of
Justice prepared and issued sample regulations which were followed by
the departments in the preparation of their own regulations. Section
14(a), as amended, required the head of each department and agency
not later than ninety days after receipt of a final investigative report to
advise the Commission as to the action taken with respect to the em-
ployee. Such information was to be included in reports on the program
prepared by the Civil Service Commission for the National Security
Council. The Civil Service Commission was also directed by this section
to make a continuing study of the manner in which the Order is being
implemented by the various departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment for the purpose of determining deficiencies in the program or
tendencies to deny to individual employees fair, impartial and equitable
treatment or rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
This was amended by Executive Order 10550 on August 5, 1954 which
required the Civil Service Commission to report to the National Security
Council semi-annually the results of such study and to recommend means
to correct any such deficiencies or tendencies.
Section 13 of Executive Order 10450 provided for the Attorney
General to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice
as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appro-
priate employee security program.
In an effort to obtain further coordination the Personnel Security
Advisory Committee was established in January of 1955. The Chair-
man was to advise department heads on difficult security cases requiring
coordination particularly in those instances in which more than one agency
had an interest. I have now assumed the chairmanship of this Committee
and on April 9, 1957 I wrote to the head of each department and agency
advising them that a representative group of experienced security officials
would be invited to participate as permanent members of the Committee.
This was done. I also stated that I would be available for consultation
with respect to dispositions to be made in individual cases.
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CONCLUSION
I would not contend that this or any other Government employee
security program is perfect in all respects, but my study of the operation
of the program and my experience with it have led me to conclude that
most of the shortcomings have not been due to the law or to the Execu-
tive Order but rather to the human element-the necessity for the
exercise of all sorts of judgment on the part of all types of people of
different backgrounds and experience. The administration of the pro-
gram was greatly strengthened and improved by the letter from the
Attorney General of March 4, 1955 which, for the most part, was
directed toward protecting the rights of the employee. The President's
establishment of a Personnel Security Advisory Committee has supplied
the coordination and supervision theretofore lacking and has contributed
materially to increased efficiency in the operation of the program. In my
opinion meetings of the type the members of this committee have had are
much more effective in resolving mutual problems and in securing uni-
formity and coordination among the various agencies than could possibly
be obtained by an independent, supervisory coordinating group.
In appraising any proposed modifications or basic changes in the
government employee security program and the need, if any therefor,
we must not forget that the job of screening federal employees has been
completed. The major concern now is with applicants. I can only con-
clude that, except perhaps for making provision for employees in non-
sensitive positions, there is little or no need for any substantial revision
of the government employee security program.
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